Output, growth, welfare, and inflation: a survey by Joseph H. Haslag






Senior Economist and Policy Advisor
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
Formal statistical analyses
fail to find a significant 
positive correlation between
inflation and per capita 
output growth.
Inflation’s effect on economic activity, and
ultimately on people’s well-being, is a primary
concern of monetary policymakers and has been
the focus of much study. For instance, analysts
have questioned whether a permanent change
in the inflation rate raises or lowers the rate of
economic growth.
In this article, I review both theoretical 
and empirical literature on this subject. I begin
with the theoretical literature, which examines
the relationship between monetary policy and
welfare, the level of output, and the rate of 
output growth. Like Stein (1970) and Orphanides
and Solow (1990), I find that equally plausible
models yield qualitatively different predictions
for the relationship between the inflation rate
and per capita output. However, when the infla-
tion rate is initially steady at zero and then
increases permanently, there is no ambiguity—
the average person suffers a welfare loss. Thus,
policymakers may face a dilemma: reducing in-
flation may raise the average person’s welfare,
but the growth rate of per capita output may fall.
I next survey the empirical literature on
the correlation between inflation and per capita
output growth. The preliminary evidence shows
a significant negative correlation. However, 
recent studies have raised doubts about this 
relationship, showing that the correlation may
not be robust. In particular, researchers have
shown that inflation is not significantly related
to per capita output growth when either a 
common set of control variables is included 
in the regressions or a different measure of 
the trend rate of output growth is used. Notably,
the formal statistical analyses fail to find a 
significant positive correlation between infla-
tion and per capita output growth. Thus, with
all the caveats, the evidence suggests a non-
positive relationship between inflation and out-
put growth.
The neoclassical growth model is the frame-
work for analysis in this article. Adoption of this
framework makes it easier to account for the
qualitative differences in the relationship be-
tween inflation and output growth. As in pre-
vious surveys, there is still disagreement about
the direction in which output moves in
response to a change in inflation, even in the
neoclassical economies. What distinguishes the
model economies is the role for fiat money. In
some cases, the researcher highlights money’s
transactions features, whereas others focus on
money as a store of value. My review suggests
that money’s different roles are key determi-
nants of the direction output growth takes in
response to a change in inflation.12
I also review some recent developments in
the inflation–output growth literature. Several
researchers have raised the issue of whether
permanent changes in the inflation rate can per-
manently affect the rate of output growth. In the
neoclassical model, long-run growth is driven
by perpetual technological advancement. Because
inflation does not drive technological advance-
ment, movements in the inflation rate potentially
affect the growth rate only along the transition
path from one steady-state value of the capital–
labor ratio to the next. In short, inflation may
have permanent effects on output level but not
on output growth rates. The endogenous-
growth literature, led by Romer (1986) and Lucas
(1988), shows that economies can unboundedly
grow in equilibrium without exogenous techno-
logical change. In view of the Romer and Lucas
results, it is natural to wonder whether differ-
ences in inflation rates account for any of the
differences in growth across countries.
The first section of the article reviews the
various mechanisms through which inflation 
affects capital accumulation in the neoclassical
setting. Next, it briefly surveys the theoretical
studies on inflation and growth. The third sec-
tion is an overview of the empirical results on
the correlation between inflation and growth.
The final section summarizes the survey.
Theories on inflation and growth
Persistent inflation is a post–World War II
phenomenon. Before then, the history of price
indexes shows bouts of inflation followed by
periods of deflation. In other words, the price
level cycles showed no discernible upward or
downward trend.
1
In the absence of persistent inflation, the
early inflation–output growth theories were built
on such cyclical observations. Economic expan-
sions generally coincided with inflation, and
contractions typically coincided with deflation.
2
Theory, therefore, sought to account for a positive
correlation between inflation and output growth.
The textbook aggregate demand–aggregate
supply framework could account for a positive
correlation between inflation and output growth.
In that theory, the chief mechanism is a positive
association between aggregate demand and the
growth rate of money. Inflation and faster output
growth are joint products of faster money growth.
Mundell (1963) was the first to articulate a
mechanism relating inflation and output growth
through something other than the excess de-
mand for commodities. In Mundell, an increase
in inflation immediately reduces people’s wealth.
To accumulate the desired wealth, people save
more, thus driving down the real interest rate.
Greater saving means greater capital accumula-
tion and thus faster output growth.
Neoclassical economies. Tobin’s (1965) con-
tribution to the inflation–output growth litera-
ture is a study of the issue in the context of the
neoclassical growth model. Tobin follows Solow
(1956) and Swan (1956) in making money a
store of value in the economy. Hence, people
can save for future consumption by either hold-
ing money or acquiring capital. In Tobin’s setup,
people hold a fraction of their income to meet
their transaction needs, despite capital’s offering
a higher rate of return.
To formalize the portfolio mechanism, con-
sider the following simplified version of Tobin’s
economy. The model is characterized by the 
following two equations:
(1) kt +1 = (1 – d)kt + it, and
(2) it = sk f (kt),
where k is the capital stock; i is gross invest-
ment spending; f (k) is the production technol-
ogy, using capital as the sole input; d is the
constant rate of capital depreciation; and sk is 
the fraction of output saved to acquire addi-
tional capital stock.
Equations 1 and 2 describe how this 
economy operates by characterizing how capital
evolves over time and by specifying the equilib-
rium condition, respectively. In equilibrium, sav-
ing, characterized as a known fraction of output,
equals gross investment; that is, st = sk f (kt) = it.
In steady state, the capital stock is constant over
time, so that equation 1 reduces to dk = sk f (k). 
In Figure 1, which depicts the equilibrium for
this simple economy, the steady state occurs
Figure 1





kFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS       13 ECONOMIC REVIEW  SECOND QUARTER 1997
where the dk line intersects the sk line.
Figure 2 depicts the portfolio mechanism.
Consider a once-and-for-all increase in the in-
flation rate from p0 to p1 (p1 > p0), which is
equivalent to saying that the return to money
has fallen. In Tobin’s portfolio mechanism, people
will substitute away from money, with its lower
return, and toward capital. In Figure 2, this 
substitution is depicted by a shift in the sk line
to sk¢. As Figure 2 shows, the portfolio mecha-
nism results in a higher steady-state capital
stock (from k0 to k1).
As Figure 2 shows, once the economy has
achieved steady state, there is no growth. In-
stead, Tobin’s framework shows that a perma-
nently higher inflation rate permanently raises
the level of output. However, the effect on out-
put growth is temporary, occurring during the
transition from steady-state capital stock, k0, to
the new steady state with capital stock, k1.
3
Indeed, growth in the neoclassical economy is
driven by exogenous technological advance-
ment—upward shifts in the f (k) curve—not by
a once-and-for-all change in the inflation rate.
Within the neoclassical setup, the next major
development in the study of inflation effects
comes from Sidrauski’s (1967) superneutrality
result. In Sidrauski’s study, people choose the
saving ratio to maximize their happiness, as
opposed to Tobin’s assumption that saving is a
fixed ratio of output. Money has an implicit
transaction feature in Sidrauski. Formally, this is
reflected in the notion that people’s happiness is
directly related to their holdings of real money
balances.
4 The main result in Sidrauski’s economy
is that an increase in the inflation rate, for ex-
ample, does not affect the steady-state capital
stock. Thus, neither output nor output growth is
related to changes in the inflation rate.
5
Why is Sidrauski’s result different from
Tobin’s? People’s saving behavior plays a crucial
role in determining whether inflation affects out-
put growth. In Tobin’s model, the portfolio
mechanism describes how people move from
money to capital when inflation rises. In
Sidrauski’s economy, people’s saving ratio falls
in response to an increase in inflation, as do
their real money balances. Indeed, people
match their decline in saving dollar for dollar
with a decline in money balances. Capital is 
unchanged in the Sidrauski model.
To demonstrate that the Tobin effect does
not depend on the assumption that saving is a
constant fraction of output, I review several
model economies in which a Tobin effect is 
present and people choose their saving rate
optimally.
One example is a study by Freeman and
Huffman (1991) in which they specify an 
economy populated by heterogenous people;
specifically, people are identifiable by their level
of wealth. To consume in the future, people can
either hold money or hold capital.
6 The rate of
return on money is strictly less than the rate of
return on capital, but people willingly hold money
because a flat fee must be paid to acquire capi-
tal. The fixed cost means that capital’s after-fee
real return is inversely related to the size of the
capital stock purchase. In other words, small
savers will prefer to hold money. Provided that
people are identical except for their wealth
holdings,  Freeman and Huffman derive a break-
even value for saving, w*, at which the return 
to money is identical to the after-fee return to
capital. Correspondingly, people saving less
than w* will hold money balances, and people
saving more than w* will prefer capital.
Consider an increase in the inflation rate
in the Freeman–Huffman model. With a lower
return on their money holdings, some of the
small savers who had held money will now find
it more appealing to pay the fee and acquire
capital. The bottom line is that Freeman and
Huffman specify a simple portfolio-substitution
effect in an explicit, optimizing framework. 
As in the Tobin economy, an increase in the 
inflation rate results in a permanently higher
steady-state level of output.
Ireland (1994) also presents a model in
which a Tobin effect is present, but it results
from a consumption–saving decision rather
than a portfolio-substitution mechanism. Ireland
specifies two alternative payment forms: govern-
ment money and credit. In using credit, people
must pay for an intermediary’s services. Two key
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ary’s cost function: at a given date t, costs in-
crease with the amount of credit, and for a given
quantity of credit, costs decline over time. The
latter assumption is designed to capture finan-
cial innovations, while the former assumption is
crucial for people to want government money.
The inflation rate affects the composition
of consumption financed by credit and by gov-
ernment money. With a cash-in-advance re-
striction, people must acquire money balances
one period prior to their actual expenditures.
Consequently, with an increase in the inflation
rate, people buy less with money because its
purchasing power erodes at a faster rate. In this
economy, time also plays an important role.
Instead of substituting away from money and
toward more credit, people may wait and con-
sume more when financial innovations have
lowered the cost of using credit. Capital is the
means by which people can practice such
patience. Over the near term, greater capital
accumulation yields temporarily faster growth.
Eventually, people will draw down their capital
reserves at a faster rate to enjoy more con-
sumption. Hence, a rise in inflation initially
results in output growing faster than trend, but
then output grows slower than trend at some
future date. In the long run, output grows at the
same trend rate, regardless of the inflation rate.
The research by Sidrauski and Freeman
and Huffman shows that money can play a 
decisive role in terms of output’s long-run re-
sponse to an increase in the inflation rate.
Sidrauski identifies money as a means of pay-
ment, whereas Freeman and Huffman see money
as competing with capital as a store of value.
Feenstra (1986) offers an interpretation of the
Sidrauski model that makes the distinction clear.
According to Feenstra, an increase in the infla-
tion rate causes people to economize on their
money balances. Moreover, the composition of
output shifts from the consumption good to
financial services. As in Sidrauski’s model, total
output—the sum of consumption and financial
services—is unchanged. An increase in the in-
flation rate, therefore, does not affect the level of
total output but does affect its composition.
Thus, the Feenstra interpretation shows that how
we pay for total output—in this case, the ratio
of output to money—may respond to the in-
flation rate, but the overall level of economic 
activity is unaffected. In Freeman and Huffman,
because money is a competing store of value, 
a rise in the inflation rate makes capital more
attractive. Inflation induces people to produce
more total output, not just change output’s 
composition.
Welfare considerations. Although a rise in
the inflation rate does not instigate a change in
the level of output in the Sidrauski model, it
would be incorrect to conclude that inflation
has no effect on people’s welfare. Here again,
Feenstra’s interpretation is useful for assessing
the welfare costs associated with an increase in
the inflation rate. As noted above, the composi-
tion of total output shifts away from the con-
sumption good and toward financial services as
the inflation rate rises. Since people’s happiness
is directly related to the quantity of the con-
sumption good, welfare is unambiguously low-
ered when the inflation rate goes up.
An increase in the inflation rate also re-
duces people’s welfare in the models presented
by Freeman and Huffman and by Ireland. In
Freeman and Huffman, all moneyholders suffer
when the inflation rate rises because the return
to money falls. With a lower real return, less
savings are available to acquire the consumption
good. In Ireland’s research, people’s consump-
tion–saving decision is distorted by inflation.
People save more to avoid the increased costs
associated with purchasing the consumption
good with either financial services or with lower
yielding money.
Thus, even though output may rise in 
response to an increase in the inflation rate, a
review of the neoclassical economies shows 
that people’s welfare will fall.
7 As such, the 
theoretical evidence points to a conundrum: 
if monetary policy raises the inflation rate, out-
put could increase, but what the benevolent 
policymaker seeks to maximize—people’s hap-
piness—would fall.
The Stockman effect. Stockman (1981) 
develops a model in which an increase in the
inflation rate results in a lower steady-state level
of output and people’s welfare declines. In
Stockman’s research, money is a complement to
capital, accounting for a negative relationship
between the steady-state level of output and 
the inflation rate.
Stockman’s insight is prompted by the fact
that firms frequently put up some cash in financ-
ing their investment projects. Sometimes the cash
is directly part of the financing package, whereas
other times, banks require compensating bal-
ances. Stockman models this cash investment
feature as a cash-in-advance restriction on both
consumption and capital purchases. Since infla-
tion erodes the purchasing power of money 
balances, people reduce their purchases of both
the cash good and capital when the inflation
rate rises. Correspondingly, the steady-state level
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inflation rate. Insofar as money acquisition is
necessary for capital accumulation, Stockman
presents a model in which money and capital
are complementary goods. The term Stockman
effect generally applies to all theoretical results
in which output is inversely related to the infla-
tion rate.
Inflation and labor. The Stockman effect
can also operate through effects on the labor–
leisure decision. Greenwood and Huffman (1987)
develop the basic labor–leisure mechanism, and
Cooley and Hansen (1989) identify the implica-
tions for capital accumulation.
In Greenwood and Huffman’s research,
people hold money to purchase the consump-
tion good and derive utility from both consump-
tion and leisure. Fiat money is valued because
there is a cash-in-advance constraint on the con-
sumption good. Greenwood and Huffman show
that the return to labor falls when the inflation
rate rises. Cooley and Hansen simplify the mecha-
nism, noting that people substitute away from
the cash good—consumption—and choose to
enjoy more leisure. Consequently, people facing
an increase in the inflation rate will substitute
away from consumption and toward leisure.
Cooley and Hansen (1989) extend the
Greenwood–Huffman mechanism to consider
capital accumulation.
8 The key assumption is
that the marginal product of capital is positively
related to the quantity of labor. Thus, when
labor quantity declines in response to a rise in
the inflation rate, the return to capital falls and
the steady-state quantities of capital and output
decline. As Cooley and Hansen show, the level
of output permanently falls in response to an
increase in the inflation rate. The mechanism
described by Cooley–Hansen emphasizes labor’s
role in determining the response of steady-state
output to inflation.
With an increase in the inflation rate, the
typical person suffers a welfare loss in the
Stockman and Cooley and Hansen setups. In the
Stockman economy, inflation distorts people’s
decisions regarding the purchase of all cash
goods, including capital. With less wealth, people
can afford a smaller stream of consumption
spending, making them worse off. In the Cooley–
Hansen setup, people respond to an increase in
the inflation rate by wanting less of the cash
good and more of the credit good, leisure. While
more leisure partially offsets the loss of the 
consumption good, the main point is that an
increase in the inflation rate has distorted people’s
choices. In effect, the Cooley–Hansen resident
consumes too much leisure and too little of the
consumption good, resulting in a welfare loss.
The literature review shows that models in
the neoclassical framework can yield very differ-
ent qualitative results with regard to inflation’s
effect on the steady-state level of output. De-
pending on money’s role, an increase in the
inflation rate can result in less output (the Stock-
man effect), more output (the Tobin effect), or
no change in output. The theoretical review
does, however, reveal one consistent result:
people’s welfare is inversely related to changes
in the inflation rate.
Endogenous growth models. Kaldor (1961)
observed persistent differences across countries
in terms of growth rates of per capita output.
This observation stimulated efforts by Romer
(1986) and Lucas (1988) to specify economies
that could grow unboundedly.
One feature accounts for the chief differ-
ence between the endogenous growth models
and the neoclassical economies. In the neoclas-
sical economy, the marginal product of capital
declines as more capital is accumulated. In the
simplest versions of the endogenous growth
models, per capita output continues to increase
because the marginal product of capital does
not fall below a positive lower bound. Indeed,
for unbounded growth, the marginal product of
capital must be greater than the rate at which
people discount future consumption.
9 The basic
intuition is that only if the rate of return on 
capital is sufficiently high will people be in-
duced to continue accumulating it.
Several studies have looked at the effect
inflation has on output growth. The studies re-
viewed here find that an increase in the inflation
rate retards growth. As with the Stockman effect,
a welfare loss accompanies a rise in the inflation
rate. In the endogenous growth models, the 
distortionary effects identified above are com-
pounded by the reduction in growth. As will be
seen, the way in which money is introduced has
a great bearing on the size of the inflation rate
effects on output growth.
The earliest versions of the endogenous
growth economies find that the inflation rate
effects on growth will be small. Gomme (1993)
studies an economy similar to the one specified
by Cooley and Hansen; that is, an inflation rate
increase results in a decline in employment. In
Gomme’s research, efficient allocations satisfy
the condition that the marginal value of the last
unit of today’s consumption equals the marginal
cost of the last unit of work. With a rise in the
inflation rate, the marginal value of today’s last
unit of consumption falls. Accordingly, the effi-
ciency condition is satisfied provided people
work less. With less labor, the marginal product16
of capital is permanently reduced, resulting in a
slower rate of capital accumulation. Gomme 
calculates the effect a permanent change in the
inflation rate would have in this economy. He
finds that eliminating a moderate inflation rate
(for example, 10 percent) results in only a very
small (less than 0.01 percentage point) gain in
the growth rate of output.
Jones and Manuelli (1995) use fiscal policy
distortions as the mechanism through which
inflation might affect growth. Jones and Manuelli
specify a model in which the tax code includes
a nominal depreciation allowance. With a rise in
the inflation rate, the discounted value of depre-
ciation tax credits falls; hence, the effective tax
on capital income is higher. People accumulate
capital at a lower rate because of the reduction
in after-tax real returns. Correspondingly, there
is a reduction in output growth. As in Gomme,
Jones and Manuelli calculate the inflation rate
effect, finding that the growth rate reduction
will be quite small. In both Gomme and Jones
and Manuelli, inflation does not directly influ-
ence capital accumulation. Instead, the capital
accumulation response is a second-order effect.
Alternative models examine how inflation
might directly affect capital accumulation and
hence output growth. Marquis and Reffert (1995)
and Haslag (1995) specify economies in which
capital and money are complementary goods.
Marquis and Reffert examine inflation rate 
effects in a Stockman economy: there is a cash-
in-advance constraint on capital. In Haslag’s
research, banks pool small savers but are 
required to hold money to satisfy a reserve re-
quirement. The reserve requirement is binding
because money offers a return strictly below that
of capital. In a reserve requirement economy,
the equilibrium return to deposits is then a
weighted sum of returns to money and capital.
Thus, an inflation rate increase drives down the
return to deposits, resulting in deposits being
accumulated at a slower rate. Since capital is a
fraction of deposits, capital accumulation and
output growth both slow. In both the Marquis
and Reffert and Haslag studies, the inflation rate
effects on growth are substantially greater than
those calculated in Gomme and Jones and
Manuelli. For instance, Haslag finds that econo-
mies with 10 percent inflation will grow 0.2 
percentage point slower than economies with
zero inflation.
10
Economic theory reaches a striking variety
of conclusions about the responsiveness of out-
put (or the growth rate of output) to changes in
the inflation rate. In the neoclassical models,
money’s role in the economy determines whether
a permanent increase in the inflation rate stimu-
lates, retards, or has no effect on the level of
output. In short: (1) if money is a complement to
capital, inflation and the output level are nega-
tively related; (2) if money and capital are sub-
stitutes, inflation and the level of output are
positively related; and (3) if money is primarily
a medium of exchange and some substitute pay-
ment medium exists, inflation and the output
level are independent. Whereas the neoclassical
models predict that the inflation rate affects the
level of output, the newer literature asks how a
rise in the inflation rate can affect the growth
rate of per capita output. In the endogenous
growth setting, research shows that money’s
role determines whether the quantitative effects
are large or negligible.
Theories are useful insofar as they account
for some observed phenomenon. In the next
section, I review the literature on the empirical
evidence relating inflation to growth.
The empirical evidence on 
inflation and growth
The chief aim of this section is to identify
the relationship between inflation and growth.
More specifically, Is the secular trend in the
inflation rate systematically related to the secular
trend rate of output growth?
Table 1 summarizes the findings of the
empirical papers cited in this article. Clearly, a
majority of studies find that inflation and growth
are systematically and negatively related. How-
ever, Levine and Renelt (1992), Bullard and
Keating (1995), and Ericsson, Irons, and Tryon
(1993) fault this conclusion. Levine and Renelt
contend that the inflation–output growth rela-
tionship is simply too tenuous. Bullard and
Keating and Ericsson, Irons, and Tryon question
whether the early studies use the correct notion
of trend.
Figure 3 plots the average values for the
inflation rate and per capita real GDP growth
rate across countries. The sample consists of
average rates of inflation and per capita real
GDP growth for eighty-two countries. The sample
means are based on annual observations span-
ning the period 1965–90. The plot shows a
weak negative correlation between per capita
output growth and the inflation rate. The coun-
tries with lower than average growth rates tend
to be the ones that have higher than average
inflation rates. The notion of trend applied in
these data is multiyear averages. (The issue of
what constitutes trend is examined in greater
detail later in this survey.)
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frequently used tool. Examples include Kormendi
and Meguire (1985), Fischer (1991), DeGregario
(1993), and Gomme (1993).
11 In general, these
studies find that the correlation between infla-
tion and per capita output growth is negative
and significant. Thus, the more formal analyses
are consistent with the ocular econometrics used
in analyzing Figure 3: countries with higher than
average inflation typically experience slower
than average output growth.
In addition to regression analysis, Fischer
employs simple nonparametric methods to look
at inflation and growth. He calculates the aver-
age inflation rates for two smaller groups of
countries; namely, those that grow at least one
standard deviation faster than the average rate
and those that grow, at most, one standard 
deviation slower than the average rate. Fischer
reports that the slow-growth countries have an
average inflation rate slightly above 30 percent,
while the fast-growth countries average only 12
percent inflation.
An obvious concern is whether the infla-
tion–output growth relationship is robust. Sarel
(1996) and Judson and Orphanides (1996) ask
whether the relationship between inflation and
growth is linear. The idea is that a 1 percentage
point increase in a low inflation rate may have
a smaller effect on output growth than a 1 per-
centage point increase in a moderate to high
inflation rate. Both studies find that the effect of
an increase in the inflation rate depends on
whether the initial rate is high or low. Specifi-
cally, an inflation rate increase does retard out-
put growth when the inflation rate is moderate
or high (defined as an inflation rate exceeding
10 percent) but is not significantly related to
output growth when inflation is low (less than
10 percent). Thus, the cross-country evidence
suggests that the inflation–output growth rela-
tionship is robust but most likely depends on
the initial inflation rate.
Other researchers have questioned whether
a systematic relationship between the inflation
Table 1










































Negative and significant 
relationship between output
growth and inflation exists.
Inflation in fast-growth group
is lower than in slow-growth
group.
Negative and significant 
relationship between output
growth and inflation exists.
Output growth and inflation
are negatively correlated.
Inflation has no significant
long-run effect on the level 
of output.
Inflation has no significant
long-run effect on output
growth.
Figure 3
Cross-Country Plots of Inflation Versus GDP
Inflation
(Percent)
SOURCE: International Financial Statistics.
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rate and growth even exists. Levine and Renelt
(1992) argue that one must first control for a set
of essential growth determinants before testing
for a systematic relationship between inflation
and output growth. Levine and Renelt find that
after including measures of physical and human
capital accumulation rates, the inflation rate is
not significantly related to per capita output
growth.
12 Thus, Levine and Renelt conclude that
the inflation–output growth relationship is 
fragile. The implication is that policymakers
should not assume that a rise in the inflation
rate will, on average, slow growth.
The Levine–Renelt criticism may overstate
the weakness in the inflation–output growth
relationship. The theoretical literature shows that
inflation effects operate through movements 
in capital accumulation—both physical and 
human. If one controls for capital accumulation
directly in the regression—as Levine and Renelt
do—it is less likely that inflation will be signifi-
cantly related to output growth. Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin (1995) show that per capita output
growth is the sum of total factor productivity
growth and growth in both physical and human
capital. Based on this growth accounting ex-
pression, it is difficult to imagine how inflation,
or any policy variable, could be significantly re-
lated to per capita output growth in regressions
that include measures of physical and human
capital accumulation rates.
Even before Levine and Renelt’s investiga-
tion, researchers were wary of putting too much
faith in the inflation–output growth relationship.
In particular, high-inflation countries are also
likely to experience highly volatile inflation
rates. If only inflation is included in the estimated
regression equation, it is impossible to deter-
mine whether it is the inflation rate or inflation
uncertainty that is determining growth.
13
The final issue is whether multiyear aver-
ages should be used to measure the trend rate of
output growth.
14 Statistical methods permit the
extraction of trend from annual observations.
The implication is that much greater country-
specific variation in the trend will occur when
the dataset has a time series of trend rates than
when the trend is single valued. Greater varia-
bility in the time series highlights the basic
trade-off facing a researcher; potentially, too
much of the high-frequency (read business cycle)
movement in the series will be incorporated
into the trend measure. Consequently, regres-
sions with more variable trend rates of output
growth potentially pollute the attempt to iden-
tify the relationship between long-run output
growth and inflation.
In Bullard and Keating’s research, the
cross-country evidence shows that there is no
systematic long-run relationship between infla-
tion and the level of output. Bullard and Keating
(1995) identify trend inflation and output for
fifty-eight countries. Here, trend is associated
with long-run relationships between series with
stochastic trends. The authors do not pool
results across countries. Instead, they estimate
separate regressions for each country, permit-
ting each country’s long-run relationships and
short-run dynamics to be different. In their
examination of the long-run relationship,
Bullard and Keating find that permanent
changes in the inflation rate are not systemati-
cally related to the level of output.
15
Summary and conclusions
In this article, I survey the theoretical and
empirical literature examining the relationship
between movements in the inflation rate and
output, output growth, and welfare. In the theo-
retical literature, an inflation rate increase unam-
biguously reduces the average person’s welfare.
However, inflation’s qualitative effect on the
level of output is ambiguous. I suggest that
inflation’s effect on output depends on why
people hold money. If the researcher empha-
sizes money as a substitute for capital, a rise in
inflation raises the long-run level of output. If
the researcher emphasizes money’s role as a
complement to capital, a rise in inflation results
in lower long-run levels of capital.
The most recent theoretical research has
studied inflation’s effect on growth rates. These
theories generally find that a rise in inflation
either results in slower growth or has no impact
on the growth rate.
In the empirical literature, research at-
tempts to find the relationship between the
trend rate of per capita output growth and the
trend inflation rate. In this article, empirical
results differ, owing mostly to the notion of
trend applied. Many cross-country studies use
multiyear averages as the measure of trend.
Early studies show that high-inflation countries
tend to grow slower that low-inflation countries.
More recent studies suggest that countries with
inflation rates above 10 percent tend to exhibit
a negative relationship between inflation and
growth, whereas in countries with average infla-
tion rates below 10 percent, there is no signifi-
cant relationship. Studies that use the trend rate
of growth each year fail to find a significant
relationship between per capita output growth
and inflation.
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findings. First, there is no empirical evidence
that there is a positive relationship between the
secular trend rate of inflation and the secular
trend rate of output growth. Second, economic
theory tells us that an inflation rate increase
makes the average person worse off.
Notes
1 For example, the U.S. producer price index in 1943
was slightly below its 1810 value.
2 Fischer’s (1926) original study established the nega-
tive comovement between inflation and the unemploy-
ment rate. With Okun’s law, the negative association
between inflation and unemployment is a positive rela-
tionship between inflation and output growth.
3 The capital stock monotonically approaches its steady
state in the neoclassical economy. Under different
conditions, the capital stock could cyclically converge
to its steady state. With cyclical convergence, the
capital stock could exhibit periods in which it rises 
and falls as it approaches the new steady-state level.
Hence, growth could either rise or fall in response to 
a rise in the inflation rate.
4 Rather than interpreting real money balances as some-
thing that makes people happier, the money-in-the-
utility-function specification is a proxy for some trans-
action technology. Feenstra (1986) shows that money
in the utility is functionally equivalent to a cash-in-
advance payment technology.
5 See Abel (1985) and Koenig (1987) for details on the
capital–labor ratio along the transition path.
6 More precisely, people can hold deposits that are
used to finance capital.
7 In much of this research, the optimal inflation rate is
equal to the person’s time rate of preference—the
Friedman rule. Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry (1996)
argue that a moderate steady inflation rate permits
maximum employment. Inflation substitutes for the
desire to avoid lowering nominal wages. Akerlof 
et al. compare outcomes by the effect on employment
and output, not welfare. Consequently, their findings
do not overturn the welfare implications reported in
this article.
8 Cooley and Hansen are primarily interested in the
business-cycle properties of an economy in which 
the inflation rate changes. Interestingly, they find that
the business-cycle properties are not substantially 
affected by changes in the inflation rate. My interest
here is in the features of their model related to 
inflation’s effect on the steady-state levels of capital
and welfare.
9 The assumption that the marginal product of capital
does not always diminish is based on the common
definition of capital, which includes physical quantities
—buildings and machines—and human features,
such as accumulated knowledge.
10 The impact of the inflation rate on growth depends on
the size of the reserve requirement. With a 15 percent
reserve requirement, an economy with 10 percent
inflation grows at a rate 0.67 percentage point slower
than an economy with zero inflation. With only a 
5 percent reserve ratio, the effect on growth is only 
0.2 percentage point.
11 These studies differ primarily in terms of the variables
included in their regressions. Kormendi and Meguire,
for example, include measures of fiscal policy, 
whereas Fischer includes measures of physical and
human capital accumulation. Details on the countries
sampled and the time periods are in Table 1.
12 Levine and Renelt’s baseline regression includes 
the investment share of real GDP, the initial (1960)
level of real GDP per capita, the initial secondary-
school enrollment rate, and the annual rate of popula-
tion growth.
13 Tommassi (1994) models the effect of inflation uncer-
tainty on economic activity. In Tommassi, inflation
uncertainty results in people putting more effort into
activities that are not counted in national income
accounts.
14 Ericsson, Irons, and Tryon (1993) identify three metho-
dological problems with the typical cross-country
regressions: aggregation over countries, aggregation
over time, and the use of growth rates instead of 
output levels. Aggregation over countries lumps low-
inflation countries with high-inflation countries. Ericsson
et al. argue that the systematic relationship owes
almost entirely to the inclusion of a small group of
African and Latin American countries. In aggregation
over time, the unit of observation is average inflation
over periods as long as several decades. Ericsson 
et al. show that contemporaneously uncorrelated 
variables can be either positively or negatively related
when averaged data are used. Finally, using first-
differences as the unit of observation, the authors
point out, imposes an unnecessary restriction on the
dynamic relationships in the data.
15 In Bullard and Keating, the first-difference in the infla-
tion rate and output growth is a stationary series. The
interpretation is that the sample mean is the best fore-
cast of output growth over an infinite horizon. Bullard
and Keating’s forecasting equations, in which output
growth eventually returns to its long-run average value,
are consistent with the neoclassical theory that a 
permanent change in the inflation rate can have only
temporary effects on output growth. Interestingly,
Bullard and Keating find evidence that the transition
phase exhibits cyclical convergence, as opposed to
the monotonic convergence predicted by the neo-
classical models.
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